The Philosophy of Science
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
[ This was a short essay question—which I expounded on—for one of my philosophy classes at school. The direct subject of chiropractic medicine was chosen by the teacher. I have no experience in this practice and so I have no partiality toward it either way. I just don’t care. But it did make for an interesting foothold to talk about the “philosophy of science” itself. And so, I decided to defend or discredit chiropractic medicine on the standard of the philosophy of science itself—an important presupposition many overlook; however, I will not play their game. I will not overlook it.]
QUEST. Is chiropractic medicine legitimate?
ANS. If medicine is “science,” then it must admit chiropractic medicine as genuine.
If medicine is defined as “the SCIENCE of restoring or preserving health,” and legitimate is defined as “conforming to recognized principles or accepted rules and standards,” then yes it would be.
SCIENCE A LOGICAL FALLACY
Medicine’s definition is based on it being science. By science, I mean scientific experimentation. Now, by scientific experimentation I mean how a scientist looks to confirm their hypotheses for what is a “cause,” by controlled tests. Logically this is called “affirming the consequent.” The problem with “affirming the consequent,” which is the basis for all scientific experimentation, is that it is a logical fallacy. Experimentation logically means, affirming the consequent. It logically works backwards from result to cause. If one gets the result, the assertion is that there must be some truth behind it. However, Correlation does not infer causation. For now, I will just skip over science’s other fatal flaws such as empiricism and induction and just focus on this.
Affirming the
consequent is stated as such—“If (P)
happens then (Q) will result. (Q) is present, or did occur, therefore, (P)
happened.”
This fallacy
flips the order of cause and effect. Example: “(P) If it rains, (Q)my yard gets wet; (Q) my yard is wet;
(P)therefore, it did rain.” This is pragmatically useful and might even be
a good guess. But! This
is irrational. It could be that my yard is wet because I watered my yard or
some other reason. Even if the (Q) is true, it does not infer that the (P) is
true. There could be an infinite numbers of other things that could be
exchanged for the (P).
If one knows a
cause, then they certainly know the result will occur, because the cause, well,
causes/makes/produces it. Therefore, affirming the antecedent (modus ponens) is
a valid form of reasoning. “(P) If an electrostatic discharge (lightning)
occurs in the clouds, (Q) then light in the form of plasma is released. (P) An
electrostatic discharge (lightning) did occur in the clouds, therefore, light
in the form of plasma was released.” Or. “(P) If it rains, (Q) then water drops hit the ground. (P) It did rain. (Q)
Therefore, water droplets did hit the ground.” This is valid, for it works
from cause to effect.
However, if I
do not know the cause but only see a result happening, then there is no logical
way, even under control experimentation, to eliminate an infinite amount of other
possibility’s that could have caused the result to happen. Correlation
does not indicate causation. Yet, does science even establish a correlation?
With
categorical logic the phrase used is “a
necessary inference.” That is, the conclusion is necessarily true if the
premises are. If all A is B and all B is C, then it is a necessary inference (it must be) that A is in the category
of C. With hypothetical syllogisms the
focus is slightly different. Because hypothetical syllogisms are
interchangeable with categorical syllogisms it means that even with
hypothetical syllogism it is correct to say the conclusion is a “necessary
inference” if sound. However, with hypothetical syllogisms the focus is more so
on the “CONNECTION,” of the antecedent (P) and the consequent (Q). The big idea
is a “necessary connection” that must
occur or be there. This FIRST, and then this absolutely follows.
One is able to
see how this works from the terms themselves: Antecedent(first/origin) and the result is the Consequence(necessarily
follows). So then, with hypothetical
syllogism the idea is not a “maybe” will follows, but absolutely and
necessarily will follows (it must follow)!
Thus, an antecedent is naturally a cause/first, and the consequent it the
result that follows due to the necessary
connection.
Logical
mistakes happen if one takes a result(follows) and forces into the
antecedent(first). One can force the terms into the logical form, but it does
not magically make a consequent an antecedent, and vis versa. Or to be it differently, taking a
first/origin and placing it into the second/result and vis versa does not
magically change reality. To say (P) If
Johnny faces hurts, (Q) then I slapped
Johnny in the face (P) thus (Q). This not correct. It is not a necessary
connection. It is not an absolutely “must be so,” connection. Could it not be
that Johnny fell and hit is head, which is why his face hurts? Now on the other hand, “(P) if Johnny did fall hard and hit his face on the pavement, (Q) then
his face will hurt/damaged. (P) thus
(Q).” Or “(P) If there are people
with God now, (Q) then the doctrine of the resurrection is true. (P) thus (Q).”
Jesus quotes the burring bush passages to prove the (P) antecedent. The
connection is a necessary connection. It must be so. The antecedent here is a
true origin/producer and the consequent is a necessary connection that follows
as a result.
Experimentation
is to start with the result and try to find the necessary connection to the
antecedent. It is logically working backwards from what follows to what started
it. This is because scientists are not omni-knowing and are looking to find
knowledge about something. If one is all knowing there is no need to conduct an
experiment, for one already knows all
true antecedents and the necessary results that follows. Thus, experimentation starts with the
consequent. But to start with the result is always a fallacy.
Now, Scientist
often hide the fallacious nature of their systematic affirmation of the
consequent(experimentation) by putting their pervious affirming the consequent
(experimentation) into the reversed logical order which is called affirming the
antecedent. It is one thing for one to
be looking at an effect—trying to determine the cause—and God reveals in divine
revelation what the cause/producer/origin is, which one might find in
Scripture. This will equate to epistemological certainty or a justified true
belief. And so, at this point one knows the cause, therefore, their
thinking—logically speaking—on this point is affirming the antecedent. The Christian scientist has many revealed
antecedents and a consequences from Scripture to begin their scientific
experimentations. This does not make their experiments logically sound, but it
begins the pragmatic process on more certain grounds.
Scientist use
induction and repeated us of affirming the consequent; therefore, when they
restate their experiment in the affirming the antecedent format they are being
naïve and moronic. They have no epistemology grounds for such certainty and their
logical system of a combined induction and experimentation makes it far worse.
It’s nothing less than an imaginary game of pretend. And I, will not pretend with them.
Take this for
example. Syllogism A is the logical
process for experimentation, which this affirming the consequent—or working
from effect to cause. Syllogism B is
how the scientist often presents his findings. The issue is that syllogism B is in the form of affirming the
antecedent, which is logically valid, but in this case, is UNSOUND because it relies
on syllogism A for its first
premise.
Syllogism
#A
A1. If chemical X is present (P),
then this solution will begin to boil (Q).
A2. The solution has begun to boil
(Q).
A3. Therefore, chemical X is present
(P).
Syllogism
#B
B1. If the solution has begun to
boil (P), then chemical X is present (Q).
B2. The solution has begun to boil
(P).
B3. Therefore, chemical X is
present. (Q)
Syllogism A is a fallacy. It is the attempt to
discover cause/producer from the effect/result by suggesting hypotheses and
testing them. It is an appeal to the result. Now, the fallacy is often
covered-up in an application of the conclusions of scientific
experimentation. That is, after syllogism A
is done in the science lab, the scientist will state this experimentation in an
affirming the antecedent type of conclusion. The problem with this is that the
first premise of syllogism B is a
fallacious premise carried over from the syllogism A. Again, this first premise from syllogism B was produced fallaciously through affirming the consequent from
syllogism A. Therefore, even though
this second syllogism is valid, it is unsound.
If the
solution boils, it does not necessarily mean chemical (X) was added—maybe
another chemical was added, or maybe heat caused it, or an infinite number of
other possible persons or objects, in an infinite number of possible
combinations, caused it. Maybe Casper the Ghost caused it. This might sound
strange to some, but the nature of science itself does not have the logical footing
to rule out the absurd. The only way is if the scientist has Omniscience. Maybe
this is how some scientist see themselves, but they have no warrant for it
based upon their own failed standards. The problem here is the scientist must
have more knowledge then their
experiment, but they don’t. There is no
getting around this incurable logical fallacy for experimentation.
ITS LIKE MAGIC.
This is a quote from (skepdic.com). They attempt the very thing above, which is
trying to hide the fact that the original presupposition/experimentation is
based upon “Affirming the Consequent,” and then just restate it as “Affirming
the Antecedent(modus ponens).” Aren’t fairy-tales nice?
In a more general way of saying, they are begging the
question in their (P), "as
predicted by our hypothesis." This phrase indicates they are in fact
working from result to cause/origin.
They think merely restating experimentation in the logical form of,
affirming the antecedent, makes the inherent problem go away. It assumes a truth
about a necessary connection from Cause/correlation to Result is now known,
based firstly from appealing to the result.
However, unless they
have more knowledge than the experiment, then they cannot justify the claim
they have discovered a cause from an effect. Just restating it in modus ponens
does not take away that they are presupposing a cause from an
effect/result. Affirming the antecedent is meant to place a known ““necessary” connection/correlation” (i.e.
cause) in the (P -antecedent) and the necessary result in the (Q). Their (P) is
originally established by induction and by affirming the consequent first. To
the restate it in affirming the antecedent is a joke and moronic and naïve
thinking—if it is meant to logically establish they have in fact discovered a
cause.
I will insert my own comments into with brackets [].
QUOTE
“Some might wonder: are not all conclusions from experimentation
invalid on this ground from the point of view of formal logic?
[They recognize the problem, but then try to magically wish it way with
flipping the logic—which does not make the effect to cause problem go away.
That is, the logical issue which made it “invalid” is still there.]
Don't scientists commit this
fallacy when they reason that (P) if my hypothesis is correct, (Q) then we will
observe x, y, and z when we do experiment E; (Q) we observed x, y, and z when
we did experiment E; (P) so our hypothesis is correct? [Yes! science does.] Yes, they would, but that is not how
competent scientists reason. They reason by the valid form of modus ponens:
[That is, according to them competent scientist pretends the logical
fallacy of experimentation away by simply restating it as affirming the
antecedent. It’s like magic. LOL! Professional Morons!]
(P) If x, y, and z occur in experiment E as predicted by our hypothesis [ “as
predicted” means they are “logically” working backwards despite putting it
modem ponens] , (Q) then our hypothesis is confirmed.
(P)
X, y, and z occurred in experiment E as predicted by our hypothesis.
(Q)
So, our hypothesis is confirmed"
I
can play this silly pretend game too. It’s my turn. I first state the argument in Affirming the
Consequent and then restate it in Affirming the Antecedent—the way the quote
says scientist ought to state predicted experimentation—to see if the restating
fundamentally makes the fallacy of effect to cause reason go away.
K1.
(P) When I eat lots of bread, (Q) then my stomach gets full.
K2.
(Q) My stomach is full.
K3.
(P) Therefore, I ate lots of bread.
But let us
play their game. I can as easily restate this fallacious affirming the consequent above, into affirming the antecedent(modus
ponens) below; however, it still does not make the fallacious logic of
appealing the result go away. The modus ponens is established on the invalid
affirming the consequent first. The
modus ponens below presented by itself might appear logically convincing to
some because the form is valid. However, the problem is that the first premise
is established by invalid logic first.
The slight of
hand is this phrase or ones like it called proof by verified prediction, which
is just a fancy name for the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent.
“Proof by verified prediction” = “affirming the consequent.” That is, the
thermology of “prediction” is a giveaway for affirming the consequent
fallacy. To rearrange such phrases,
“prove by prediction,” or “as predicted by our hypothesis,” in modus ponens
does not mystically make the fallacy of reasoning from effect to cause go away.
M1. (P) If my stomach gets full (as predicted by our hypothesis. LOL),
(Q) then I ate a large amount of bread (our
hypothesis is confirmed!).
M2. (P) My stomach is full (our hypothesis is confirmed!).
M3. (Q) Therefore, I ate a large amount
of bread (as predicted by our hypothesis.). MAGIC!!!!
TRUTH TABLE of EQUIVALENCE.
I have been
zeroing in on the ontological (i.e. reality, causality) problem that affirming
the consequent commits, when it reasons from a result in reality to a cause in
reality. I have demonstrated by
counterexample the issue of this; however, here I will demonstrate by a truth
table how this is a problem.
The logical
problem going from, “..if P, then Q,” to then a “…if Q, then P,” or vise versa, may be
demonstrated in a truth table. This is to find out if two sets of propositions
are logically Equivalent or not. If they are not logically equivalent—using the
same propositions, then it is a logical mistake to treat them as logically
equivalent. To be logically equivalent they need to the same T’s and F’s to be
the same under the main operator. They are not.
Click Link for Truth Table.
http://www.osheadavis.com/images/stories/truth_table_logical_equivalent.jpg
SUMMARY.
APPEAL
TO THE RESULT.
Science is simply an appeal to the result. The supposition
is that if you see the result you predict, then there must be some truth behind
it. This is always a logical fallacy. Correlation does not infer causation.
People seem to equate science’s pragmatic benefits to suppose it gives
knowledge or truth. It would be an equivocation to go from pragmatic usefulness
to truth, yet many make this moronic mistake due to their love-affair with
science’s usefulness.
The scientific
method suggests that you must identify variables and perform controlled
experiments. But the problem of infinite alternatives remain the same.
Suppose a
scientist swings a pendulum, makes some objects bump into one another, or
performs some kind of experiment like this. He identifies certain variables
such as altitude, weight, temperature, and so on. However, he can never say
that he has identified all variables, such as an alien messing with his
experiment from space, or an unruly and invisible spirit tempering with his
project for its own amusement.
These latter
possibilities may seem absurd, but according to what standard are they absurd?
Only according to the scientist’s own assumptions. Also, even if we admit that
these are absurd, there are still an infinite number of variables that may or
may not be present. The scientist may be missing an entire category of
variables. For example, what if the scientist has no concept of temperature? He
cannot then possibly measure and control it in an experiment. Yet it might be a
decisive factor. If he does not know about it, he cannot even say that he does
not know about it. Neither can he say that he knows this category of
variables does not exist. There is an infinite number of possible categories of
variables that he is missing. Therefore, a scientist can never say that he has
accounted for all relevant variables, and he can never claim to have
“constructed properly” any experiment.
The scientist
simply does not know — he assumes without argument, without evidence, and
without proof. He can do what he wishes, but if he claims that this whole thing
is rational, then he is just arbitrarily calling it so. In fact, from even
a simple analysis of science, there is no way that a scientist can claim to
have any rational contact with reality at all. And certainly, he would have no
right to call the Christian irrational.
The idea is
simple. To know that any experiment is “constructed properly” the
scientist’s knowledge must be “bigger” than the experiment. But if his
knowledge is already “bigger” than the experiment, then he hardly needs to
perform the experiment to gain knowledge that is limited by the experiment. The
only way to be sure that one has identified and controlled all variables that
may affect the experiment is to possess omniscience. The conclusion is that
only God can tell us about the universe.
Furthermore, INDUCTION.
Some try to rescue induction by saying it can
give probable outcomes. This is misleading.
To establish probability one needs a numerator and a denominator. For
the sake of argument I will pretend science/induction is able to give a
numerator; but what about the denominator? To establish this, one needs a
universal proposition and often one needs to have omniscience to establish
this. Since induction cannot establish a universal, then to say induction is
able give probability it is nonsense.
In addition, EMPIRICISM.
Empiricism is the epistemology that says all
knowledge comes from senses. There are hybrid epistemologies that say that some
knowledge comes from the senses, but they face the same logical problems.
Then there are the issues of universal
presuppositions that one must have first in order to think and comprehend
anything such as, (1) laws of logic, and (2) the ideas of space, of
measurement, time and a unit. Empiricism cannot give universals, but one must
already have them to think. Empiricism
is a childish superstition.
If by empiricism there is no possible way for
knowledge to be in the mind, then there is no worldview. In fact, there is
nothing. No knowledge means there is nothing to talk about. Nothing. It poses
no logical threat to my worldview, or to any worldview for that matter.
Clark on Empiricism
(Clark) Empiricism: No self
“Berkeley was quite sure that
there must exist a mind to have these impressions. A mountain is something
perceived, and a perception can exist only in a mind. But Hume was acute enough
to see the next step. If material substance is an absurdity because it is an
abstract idea, so too is the spiritual substance or the mind. Experience
consists entirely of images, impressions, and their resulting combinations. No
one has experienced a Self. What common opinion calls a person is simply a
bundle of images. And this, as was argued above, results in skepticism. If all
knowledge is based on experience, we may conclude, there is no knowledge.”
(Clark) Empiricism: Time, Space & Math
“All this may be
so, but it is a poor defense of empiricism. The trouble lies deeper. If
knowledge is a result of sensory experience, or even of internal experience –
if after Hume there can be any internal experience – how could the ideas of
space and time be obtained? Time has never been impressed on the senses so that
we might have an image of it. If anyone thinks he has an image of time, let him
describe its color, its shape, and smell. But more profoundly Kant argues,
The idea of time
does not originate in our senses, but is presupposed by them. For sensory
impressions can be represented as simultaneous or successive only through the
idea of time. Succession does not produce the concept of time, but presupposes
it.
Similarly, with
respect to space Kant argues that the idea of space is not abstracted from
external sensations, for I cannot conceive anything external to me except by
representing it as in a place where I am not. Therefore external perceptions do
not originate but presuppose the idea of space.
Space and time,
for Kant, give the basis for mathematics – for geometry and arithmetic
respectively. And the truths of mathematics are examples of truths that cannot
be derived from experience. Teachers of small children may think that “two and
two are four” is taught by playing with marbles. Does not the teacher show the
pupil how two marbles and two marbles make four marbles? Roll them together
into a corner and see that there are four marbles. Then, after this is done
with different colored marbles, and different sized marbles, and with pencils
and erasers, the child generalizes or abstracts from his experience the truth
that two and two are four. However, this explanation of the learning process
seems to be unsatisfactory. In the first place, the child would have to
recognize one marble before he could count two of them. Where did the concept
of a unit come from? From the marble also? But would not the pupil have to have
the concept of a unit before he recognized a marble as one? If he did not know
one, he could not count one. He has to know the numbers in order to count. And
in the second place, this consideration holds for four as well as for one. He
must know four before he can count four marbles. Perhaps this can more clearly
be seen if large numbers are used. Let the teacher try to teach the young child
that 356 marbles and 791 marbles are 1147 marbles. Everyone has heard children
say their numbers: one, two, three, four, seven, sixteen, five, twenty‑one, sintillion. The young
child who so counts cannot learn the example by counting marbles because he
cannot count numbers. He can count marbles only after he can count numbers. And
since numbers are not marbles or anything else sensory, it follows that arithmetic
is not abstracted from experience. So much for mathematics.”
(Clark) Empiricism: Logic
“Hume’s analysis
of causality also points up essentially the same difficulty in empiricism.
While Hume treated the subject more or less in isolation, Kant saw that a
general principle was involved. Physics as well as mathematics requires
necessary and universal judgments, and these are impossible on an empirical
basis. All images, sensations, or experiences are unique occurrences….
No doubt we are accustomed to this sequence of
events just as we expect the Sun to rise in the east tomorrow; but there is no
logic by which we may begin with a few experiences of the past and arrive at a
judgment about the future…
If all knowledge
is based on experience, no statement can validly be made about the future, for
experience is always past. Even if it were possible to learn by experiment that
two and two have always been four, and that the Sun has always risen in the
east, there would be no conclusive reason for supposing that these things would
be the same tomorrow. But not only does this principle of universality and
necessity prevent an empirical knowledge of the future; it applies to the past
as well. Since no one can have experienced every case, empiricism cannot consistently
assert that the Sun has always risen in the east, that two and two have always
been four, or, to use one of Kant’s examples, that all bodies are heavy.
Similarly, no experience necessitates the conclusion that every change requires
a cause.
More important
still, the validity of syllogistic reasoning can never be based on experience.
The laws of logic may well be called more important than the propositions of
mathematics and physics because logic underlies them both. In all our
conversation and writing, the forms of logic are indispensable: Without them
discussion on every subject would cease. But if empiricism cannot establish the
truth that two and two will always be four, neither can it assert that the
conclusion of Barbara always and necessarily follows from the premises.
Empiricism, therefore, is conclusively shown to be skeptical, because the law
of contradiction cannot be abstracted or obtained from temporally conditioned
particulars. And without the law of contradiction it is impossible to say
anything meaningful. Scientists like Pearson, Carlson, or Bridgman, and liberal
theologians like Brightman, may produce complicated and persuasive systems of
thought; but if they claim to be empiricists, their systems contradict their
epistemological principles, for if all knowledge is based on experience, there
is no knowledge.”
(Clark) Empiricism: Equivocation from God to
man
If empiricism is used to prove
God from nature to man’s knowing God then the fallacy of equivocation or a 4
term fallacy occurs. The definition of
existence(is) if constructed through
empiricism, cannot produce the same definition of (is) in what the Bible means
by it: “Must believe that God is.”
(Hebrews 11:6).
St. Thomas and other modern
philosophers (Van Til) try to rescue this by using the idea of analogy. There
is a logic and a fallacious way to use an analogy. The point that makes analogies valid or
invalid is if the terms in the syllogism are the same. Using empiricism in this
context to know God’s existence makes the terms not the same and so invalid.
There is the more basic problem of empiricism
not being able to validly go from an “is” to a “proposition” in the mind. What
is indirectly or directly sensed and the copies of these sensations as an
indirect images of the so-called real things, to then concepts in the
mind. Famous philosophers in history
such as Locke, Berkeley to Hume recognized this issue. But as Hume concluded,
it is an inescapable fallacy that empiricism is stuck with. Empiricism creates
an abyss of skepticism.
Then there is more particular problems
related to this such as empiricism going from an “is”(what is) to an “ought(what
ought to be).”
But as for analogies here is Clark again.
“It follows, therefore, that the Thomistic proofs of the existence of
God are invalid on two counts. First there are the previous empirical
difficulties with causality, abstraction, and logic; but now there is this
second. Even if no other fallacy were to be found in the arguments, and if we
should arrive validly at the conclusion, God exists, this existence at which we
have arrived would not be God’s existence. Syllogisms and valid arguments
require their terms to be used univocally. If this has been done, the
“analogical” and actual existence of God has not been obtained. All through the
argument the term exist or is has been used in a human or temporal sense; and
if the argument is valid, the term in the conclusion must also have the same
temporal sense. But in this sense of the word exist, God does not exist. Once
more, empiricism has failed.”
(Clark)
Empiricism: Categories, Classification
If the arguments of the last few paragraphs are sound, along with the
considerations on empiricism that occurred in several of the earlier chapters,
a satisfactory theory of epistemology must be some sort of apriorism with or
without intellectual intuition. The notion that a blank mind can learn must be
repudiated.
Of all the modern philosophers it is Immanuel Kant who is naturally
thought of first as a representative of a priori theory. For him experience
gives us a rather indefinite, even chaotic manifold of sensation, and the mind
arranges, or imposes unity on, this manifold by the application of innate
categories so that knowledge results. All items of knowledge are judgments or predications.
A term, such as triangle, by itself cannot be either true or false. But if one
says, “the triangle is an isosceles triangle,” or, “the triangle is a
four-sided figure,” one has said something either true or false. All judgments
are classifications. This triangle is classified under the species of isosceles
triangle, or, falsely, under the class of four‑sided
figures. Two terms, therefore, the subject and the predicate, are brought
together. Thus the mind imposes unity on experience by judging or classifying.
Since judgments or propositions are the products of the mind’s unifying
activity, the several types of judgment are witnesses to several functions of
unity. These are the categories, the non‑empirical
contribution of the mind to knowledge – the prerequisites of learning. They are
not based on or derived from experience, but rather the possibility of meaningful
experience depends on them.
To one who has been impressed by the universal and necessary factors
in knowledge, in particular the law of contradiction and the validity of
implication, and who sees clearly the epistemological skepticism and ontological
nihilism implied in empirical philosophy, this a priori view is inescapable.
And yet when one comes to work out the details, there is danger of emulating
Kant’s many self‑contradictions.
At any rate, Kant’s categories cannot be accepted as they are. ……
Kant might continue to object that no one should be allowed to have
his cake and his penny, too. The categories are either derived from experience
or they are innate. By this decisive disjunction, so Kant might argue, the
preformation theory is proved to be unfair to organized philosophy. However,
preformationism does not repudiate the disjunction as just stated: The
categories are indeed innate, but in addition God has fashioned both the mind
and the world so that they harmonize. And some such scheme must be accepted if
the Kantian a-priori is no less skeptical than empiricism. That the cake and
penny illustration is inapplicable may be seen by asking the question, Does the
law of contradiction hold in thought or does it hold with things? The objector
would have to choose one and reject the other. But is it not more plausible to
say that the law of contradiction applies both to thought and to things? Even a
Ding-an-sich, unknowable as and if it is, cannot also be a Not-Ding-an-sich.”
Empiricism:
UNSOUND and INVALID.
How does one show in formal validity
sensation to a proposition in the mind? I ask anyone to show me how a sensation
deduces into a proposition in the mind? It cannot be done in formal
validity. Even if one wishes to say
there is no incorporeal mind, then the same argument must be shown going from
sensation to information in the physical brain. No one can do this.
How would one logically argue for
empiricism? Let us put such an argument in a valid AAA syllogism. We will home
in on sensation from the eye or seeing.
A1. [What is sensed by the eye] is
[that which is a picture in the mind].
A2. [A picture in the mind] is [true
and false propositional knowledge in the mind].
A3. THUS. [What is sensed by the eye]
is [true and false propositional knowledge in the mind].
The are 2 major problems that make
this syllogism unsound or invalid. First are the premises themselves. How can
empiricism defend such assertions to begin with? The second problem is dealing
with four term fallacy or equivocation.
Empiricism:
Unjustifiable premises.
“What is
sensed by the eye is a picture in the mind.” How can it be empirically
proven—as a universal truth—that what is sensed by the eye is a picture in the
physical brain? Is not the purpose of the sensation to bring external input
into the brain to think about? If there is no way to show a picture in the
brain of what is sensed then empiricism fails.
If a doctor shows parts of the brain lighting up on their computer
screens when one thinks, then so what? This is still not showing that the brain
actually sees a picture from the sensation of the eye. Even if a physical
picture can be shown to be in the brain somehow or somewhere on their
“instruments,” this still is not a proof but an unsound conclusion. It would be
an effect. It is still working from effect to cause. It is still affirming the
consequent. It is the same with radio waves being heard as music in
your radio. The music as produced by the radio instrument are only effects of
the radio waves, which I cannot sense. Now, because the music is an effect of
radio waves, then how does one know the cause? If one infers result to cause,
then how does one logically prove the inference is valid? It cannot be done of
course.
However, there must be a mind, for
without an immaterial mind that thinks in propositions there is not truth and
skepticism—which is self-refuting would result.
Gordon Clark says,
The idealistic philosophers have argued
plausibly that truth is also mental or spiritual. Without a mind truth could
not exist. The object of knowledge is a proposition, a meaning, a significance;
it is a thought. And this is necessary if communication is to be possible. If a
truth, a proposition, or a thought were some physical motion in the brain, no
two persons could have the same thought. A physical motion is a fleeting event
numerically distinct from every other. Two persons cannot have the same motion,
nor can one person have it twice. If this is what thought were, memory and
communication would both be impossible. The reply might be made that although
the motions are numerically distinct, they are generally similar; therefore,
today I have the motion, Columbus discovered America, and tomorrow I have
another one like it. This reply, however, is faulty. Suppose, for the sake of
argument, that two motions can be similar: A baseball pitcher can throw a curve
and later a second curve like it; and one cortical quiver could be like a second.
But how could anyone tell that the two motions were similar…..
Or, more to the point, how could any
motion connect two other motions that no longer exist? When the second motion
occurs, the first thought of Columbus is gone. In its absence how can the second
be compared with it and pronounced similar? If only we could remember it! But
memory, the making present of the past, is impossible on a physical theory. The
first motion as a physical event in time and space is completely and
irretrievably gone. It may as a cause initiate a second motion, but it itself
no longer exists; and to say that a non‑existent
motion is similar to an existing motion is hardly more intelligible than to say
they are the same. It is a peculiarity of mind and not of body that the past
can be made present. Accordingly, if one may think the same thought twice,
truth must be mental or spiritual. Not only does it defy time; it defies space
as well, for if communication is to be possible, the identical truth must be in
two minds at once. If, in opposition, anyone wishes to deny that an immaterial
idea can exist in two minds at once, his denial must be conceived to exist in
his own mind only; and since it has not registered in any other mind, it does
not occur to us to refute it.
Then there are all the logically
absurdities that results such as: does one know they are having a sensation?
How can this be other than by a sensation? What is the sensation that senses a
sensation? And how do we know this sensation senses a sensation other than by a
sensation that senses the sensation that senses the first sensation? Is the
lack of a sensation a sensation? How does one know this? By sensation?
Therefore, how can empiricism
escape begging the question and infinite regress?
Moreover, an invisible concept of a
true and false proposition is not a physical thing. A propositional thinking is not physical. But
sensation is physical. Sensation is not
understanding of the sensation. But understanding a true and false propositions
of a sensation is not the sensation itself. Now one can just arbitrary and
without justification assert something at this point to make the leap from
physical sensation to an invisible understanding in the mind, but a child can
widely assert without justification. If
invisible knowledge comes by sensation is true, then where is the
justification? Where is the logically valid argument to prove it?
To have a picture in the mind of
Mt. St. Helens is a copy of it; it is not the actual Mountain. But then to
think propositional thoughts about the indirect copy of the real Mt. St. Helens
is another step in being indirect. And
if empiricism is the first principle for knowledge, then there is no way to validly to go from sensation to
knowledge.
To understand a concept about a
picture one needs the laws of logic, but how does one sense the law of
noncontradiction? If one saw the LoC used or applied but then inferred the LoC
from this, then how is one’s knowledge from sensation? If it is sensation plus
logical inference then how does one get the logic to begin with if knowledge
comes by sensation? If one uses the
sensation before they had the invisible universal LoC—so that all sensation
could mean both one thing and its contradictory—then was not all sensation
nonsense? If one did apply the LoC to
their senses, then how could one do it before they had the invisible universal
LoC? This is important because one cannot have an invisible proposition about a
picture sensed by the eye if there is was LoC or laws of logic. That is, in
order to think a thought one needs the invisible universal LoC first, so that
one might have an invisible true or false proposition, “I like this apple I
see.”
B1. [A picture in the mind] is
[physically coded information].
B2. [Conceptual information] are [true
and false propositional knowledge in the mind].
B3. Thus. [A picture in the mind] is [a
true and false propositional knowledge in the mind].
The problem with
syllogism B is also two-fold.
FIRST. How is promise B1. proven?
Let us for sake of argument say DNA is a code based language (by physical
symbols) for complex operations for the body. So what? Stepping aside the presuppositional issues
how readable code got there and issue of logic of the code and how one validly
infers from this with only sensation (etc), let us focus on the immediate
issue. If I think a proposition right now, “Empiricists
are dumb, can it be seen on my physical brain the logic used and the actual
proposition, “Empiricist are dumb.” Even if this could be seen on an instrument
on my physical brain, then how does this avoid reasoning from effect to cause?
How does one know the inference was valid?
The law of noncontradiction (and all
universals) and propositional concepts that I think right now are invisible.
How does one validly infer physical to invisible? Also, how does one validly
infer the universal invisible LoC from physical inductive transit sensations?
Empiricism is only physical, inductive and not universal; and so, by its own
foundation it divorces itself from “all” knowledge. From All knowledge.
SECOND. As already been shown to go
from Premise B1. “physically coded
information,” to B2. “Conceptual
information” is an equivocation or (four term fallacy) because the first
term is about physical symbols that then changes into concepts, which by
definition are invisible. There is no
way to validly prove empiricism.
INCURABLY
FALLACIOUS
To suppose
that science yields truth is nothing less than blind superstition. Some might wish more could be said of
science. Yet, the impossibility for science to produce truth is built into its
epistemology, assumptions and method. There is no way to salvage empiricism,
induction and affirming the consequent from irrationality. It is incurably fallacious.
The beauty of
science, which is also its cage of limitation, is that while it cannot give
truth, or even rationally prove correlation, is that it is rather pragmatically
useful. This means that even if it is wrong, it can still produce a useful
repeatable result that men may apply for their benefit.
SCIENCE WAS WRONG, But it Sill Cured the Cow
Gordon Clark,
in “A Christian View of Men & Things,” (2005, pg.118) says this,
“Naturally a great many people, steeped in nineteenth-century
scientific traditions, react violently to the idea that science is all false. Did we not make
the atom bomb, they say? Does not vaccination prevent smallpox? Cannot we
predict the position of Jupiter and an eclipse of the Sun? Verified prediction
makes it forever ridiculous to attack science. This reaction is, of course,
understandable, however irrational it may be. The argument has not “attacked”
science at all; it has insisted that science is extremely useful – though by
its own requirements it must be false. The aim nowhere has been to attack
science; the aim is to show
what science is.
How science can be useful though false is illustrated in a delightful
textbook on inductive logic. Milk fever, the illustration goes, until late
in the nineteenth-century, was a disease frequently fatal to cows. A
veterinarian proposed the theory that it was caused by bacteria in the cow’s
udder. The cure, therefore, was to disinfect the cow, which the veterinarian
proceeded to do by injecting Lugol solution into each teat. The mortality under
this treatment fell from a previous ninety percent to thirty. Does not this
successful treatment prove that the bacteria were killed and that Lugol cured
the disease? Unfortunately, another veterinarian was caught without the Lugol
solution one day, and he injected plain boiled water. The cow recovered. Had
water killed the bacteria? What is worse, it was found later that air could be
pumped into the cows’ udders with equally beneficial results. The original science was
wrong, but it cured the cows nonetheless.
A closer examination of the logic of verification should be made. In
the example above, the first veterinarian probably argued: (P) If bacteria cause milk fever, (Q) Lugol
solution will cure; (Q) the disinfectant does cure it; (P) therefore, I have
verified the hypothesis that bacteria cause milk fever.
This argument, as would be explained in a course on deductive logic, is a fallacy.
Its invalidity may perhaps be more clearly seen in an artificial example: If a
student doggedly works through Plato’s Republic in Greek, he will know the
Greek language; this student knows Greek; therefore, he has read Plato’s
Republic. This is the fallacy of asserting the consequent, and it is invalid
whenever used.
It is
precisely this fallacy that is used in every case of scientific verification.
If the law of gravitation is true, a freely failing body will have a constant
acceleration, and the eclipse will begin at 2:58:03 p.m.; but freely falling
bodies do have a constant acceleration, and the eclipse did begin at 2:58:03
p.m.; therefore, the law of gravitation is true. Or, if the periodic table of
atomic weights is true, a new element of such and such a weight must exist;
this new element has now been discovered; therefore, the periodic table is
verified. And, if I eat roast turkey and plum pudding, I lose my appetite; I
have lost my appetite; therefore, we had roast turkey for dinner.
All these arguments are equally invalid. But sometimes there is an
adverse reaction if it is claimed that verification never proves the truth of a
scientific law. Is it worse
to “attack” science or to “murder” logic?”
Below we will observe the above example in basic
propositional logic to scrutinize in detail the fallacy (effect to cause
restated as modus ponens). Next the problem of science from Clark’s example
will be also be shown in denying the consequent. Then it will be shown in
affirming the consequent.
FIRST. It will
first be stated as a scientist will state it going from affirming the
consequent to then restating it in affirming the antecedent.
Syllogism
#G – Invalid
G1. If the Lugol solution is
injected into cow’s udders (P), then
the lugo solution will kill the bacteria and the cows will have a better
morality rate. (Q).
G2. The bacteria has decreased in
the udders and the cow’s mortality rates have been improved. (Q).
G3. Therefore, the lugol solution
was injected and by this verified our prediction. (P).
The Veterinary
tries this syllogism several times; he repeats this in many different farms and
many different cows with great success. After this he believes he has enough
controlled repeated tests to establish his hypotheses as truth. He proceeds to
published his findings in Veterinarian Weekly magazine. He restates his
experimentation( the logically fallacious Affirming the Consequent – Syllogism
G) in the logic of Affirming the
Antecedent (Syllogism H). This again is a mistake logically speaking. This
restated Modus Ponens still starts off with a premise that was established to
begin with by a logical fallacy. The logical problem is still there. One cannot wave a wand and make it disappear
by simply restating it.
Syllogism #G is logically invalid. Syllogism #H although it valid because it is a
modus ponens form, yet because it depends on Syllogism G it is still unsound.
Syllogism #H – Unsound
H1. If the bacteria has decreased in
the udders and the cow’s mortality rates have been improved (as predicted by
our hypothesis) (P), then Lugol
solution was injected into cow’s udders (Q).
H2. The bacteria has decreased in
the udders and the cow’s mortality rates have been improved (P).
H3.
Thus, the Lugol solution was injected into the cows udders. (Q)
SECOND.
Denying the Consequent.
Karl Popper
Denying the Consequent works well for falsifying a
scientific experiment and conclusions drawn from it—for multi part theory it
would falsify just the one aspect involved. This is another reason why science
can disprove a theory or be consistent with a “theory” but NEVER “prove,” it.
It is also why science is never true.
This works well for an immediate falsification. The famed
Karl Popper is correct, in that just one observation of a black swan falsifies
the categorical claim that all swans are white. This happens often in science,
which is one of the reasons it is constantly changing. Here is the question. Does, 2 + 2 = 4, ever
change? No. If the truth is already known, then there is no change. Professional
morons (non-Christians) call this “progressivism,” however, it is just a smoke
screen to cover up the problem that they do not have the truth.
“Although in
science we do our best to find the truth, we are conscious of the fact that we
can never be sure whether we have got it….In science there is no
"knowledge," in the sense in which Plato and Aristotle understood the
word, in the sense which implies finality; in science, we never have sufficient
reason for the belief that we have attained the truth.…
Einstein
declared that his theory was false – he said that it would be a better
approximation to the truth than Newton's, but he gave reasons why he would not,
even if all predictions came out right, regard it as a true theory.”
(Karl Popper)
Denying the consequent is essentially a “contrapositive” of
affirming the antecedent. In categorical form, it would be something like: “Oshea
is a man.” The contrapositive would be, “All non-man is non-Oshea.” In
propositional form it would be, “If oshea is something, then he is a man.” The
contraposition would be, “If something is not a man, then it is not Oshea.”
Syllogism #C.
C1.
(P) If the Lugol solution is injected into cow’s udders, (Q) then the lugo
solution will kill the bacteria and the cows will have a better morality rate.
C2.
~(Q) (i.e. not Q) It has been shown that air injected into the udder will kill
the bacteria and give the cows a better morality rate.
C3. Therefore, ~(P) It is not necessarily true
that Lugol solution was injected into the cow’s udders, it could have been air
or something else.
Charles Bennett (Phd who is the Principal Investigator of
NASA's highly successful Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe), reminds us of
this topic in this letter to Science magazine.
“The title of
the 6 May News of the Week story ‘At long last, Gravity Probe B satellite
proves Einstein right’ (p. 649) made me cringe. I find myself frequently
repeating to students and the public that science doesn’t ‘prove’ theories.
Scientific measurements can only disprove theories or be consistent with them.
Any theory that is consistent with measurements could be disproved by a future
measurement. I wouldn’t have expected Science magazine, of all places, to say a
theory was ‘proved’.”
Science magazine editors responded
back admitting Bennet was correct.
Let us examine the actual syllogism of experimentation Clark
put together and then try the valid use of falsification (denying the consequent ) on it. Clark’s syllogism starts one more step back
from the syllogism I constructed. This is a good illustration to show that at
every step of the way a scientist must fallaciously use affirming the
consequent, because in many cases the are many steps of cause and effect which
the science must work backs in logic.
Syllogism L
L1.
(P) If bacteria cause milk fever, (Q) then Lugol solution will cure;
L2.
(Q) the disinfectant does cure it;
L3.
(P) therefore, I have verified(consistent) the hypothesis that bacteria cause
milk fever.
This is fallacious reasoning; the
consequent is affirmed. As said before, my belly might be full due to me eating
a large portion of watermelon rather than bread.
Syllogism N
N1.
(P) If bacteria cause milk fever, (Q) then Lugol solution will cure;
N2.
~(Q) (not Q) Air cured it;
N3.
(P) therefore, I have falsified the hypothesis that bacteria cause milk fever.
THIRD.
Affirming the Consequent.
Affirming the consequent focuses—not on the immediate falsification of the scientific experiment and
thus showing in a pragmatic why induction is fallacious—rather it focuses
on the inherent problem/fallacy of working from effect to cause (which is the
issue of affirming the consequent). To reason from effect to cause is to
irrationally think one has more information than the experiment gives. The scientist
must assume a type of omni-knowing divine mind, but at this point with
omni-knowledge there is no need to do the experiment because all is already
known. The scientist tries to avoid this
issue by controlled tests, which is to construct properly an environment that
limits factors that could affect the experiment. But again, the only way to do
this is to have more knowledge than the experiment itself. If this is the case
then there is no need for an experiment, for he already has more knowledge than
his experiment.
It is affirming the consequent, and
so a fallacy.
Syllogism
#D.
D1. If the Lugol solution is
injected into cow’s udders (P), then the lugo solution will kill the bacteria
and the cows will have a better morality rate. (Q).
D2. The bacteria has decreased in
the udders and the cow’s mortality rates have been improved. (Q).
D3. Therefore, the lugol solution
was injected [and so is alleged to be the cause/correlation] (P).
The problem
with this, as the example before showed, it could have been water or air that
was injected into the udder. Also, this shows that there is no ”necessary” connection that the lugol solution is even a correlation
let alone a cause. Trying to find a necessary connection by working backwards
from result to origin is always a logical fallacy.
Therefore, I deny any philosophy/worldview or
system of thinking about the world that relies on empiricism, induction and
affirming the consequent to produce propositional knowledge has any rational
grounds to say anything, let alone the origins of the world. Such a system of
thinking is so incurably fallacious that is cannot even give knowledge about
something so basic as, “there is an apple
on my desk.” If a philosophy cannot produce any knowledge it is not merely
that it is a failure, but that it is nothing.
Such intellectually inferiority is to be mocked and dismissed.
And so,
because medicine is based upon science, then chiropractic medicine is a valid
medicine if the chiropractic doctors and patients get the pragmatic results
they are looking for. Maybe it is the true cause; OR, maybe it is just a
correlation to something indirectly related to the cause. Maybe chiropractic
medicine has no connection to cause
or correction of the problem; however, as long as the patients get the
pragmatic results they are looking for—just as with the cow’s udders and the
Lugol solution—then it is a legitimate
medical SCIENCE. Because medicine is
defined as “science” then it must
admit chiropractic medicine as genuine medicine.
Premise 1 is fine as a modus ponens because the
antecedent (P), “when I eat lots of bread,”
it is starting with the cause and then moving to a necessary connection/result, “my stomach gets full.” It is
appealing to the cause. In fact, it can be shown from the Bible that eating—at
least normally—fills the stomach up, as a truth about a normally occurring
cause and effect in the world—which is controlled God’s direct and absolute
sovereignty.
[16] With permission from the Trinity Foundation.
Copyright © 1998-2014, The Trinity Foundation,
Post Office 68, Unicoi, Tennessee 37692
Phone: 423.743.0199 Fax: 423.743.2005
[21] Vincent Cheung, Presuppositional Confrontations,
pg.13, 2003
[22] Vincent Cheung, Ultimate
Questions, pg 58, 2010
[23] Romans 2:1, “Therefore you are inexcusable, O man,
whoever you are who judge, for in whatever you judge another you condemn
yourself; for you who judge practice the same things.”
[37] This is only an assertion, to which neither he nor
anyone has proved.
[38] I could state the Scriptures equates itself to God,
but that would be irrelevant in the since that this man’s statement collapses
on itself before it can bear any weight in the discussion.
[39] I have dealt
with this in several articles on my website and in my book: The First
Importance of the Gospel. The principle
of Scripture of Jesus and the apostles is if a person willfully resists the
Scriptures they are to be rebuked, called morons and corrected in the gospel.
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